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'CONCEPTUAL OBSOLESCENCE IN LAW AND
ACCOUNTING - FINANCE RELATIONS
BETWEEN RETAILER .AND . ASSIGNEE
OF RETAIL RECEIVABLES
HOMER KRIPKE*
Commercial law is society's'agency for social control of business,
and accounting is the means by which the diversity of business is
reduced to a common language of dollars. It is a recurring' experience
that as business problems develop, law and accounting must strain
to ,keep their applicable concepts meaningful and useful. The most
notable ekample of such a readjustment now occurring is in the ac-
counting treatment of the sale-and-lease-baCk and related direct leas-
ing, and the draftsmanship problems with which lawyers are strug-
ling to plug the hole in indenture debt restriction covenants which
leasing had opened up.1
Another, less well-known, evidence of the inadequacy of con-
ventional categories appears in' the problems of the relationship be-
tween a seller of goods who sells on the "instalment plan" and the
bank, sales finance company, or other financial institution which
provides him with the funds to finance the resulting instalment re-
ceivables. The seller of goods will herein be called "the retailer,"
although he may be a factory selling at retail through a factory
branch. The bank or other financial institution will herein be called
"financing agency."
The writer has described elsewhere how the twentieth-century
development of durable chattels embodying a long-term use-value
caused the growth of instalment selling as the economic means by
which the users were enabled to pay for the goods over a period of
time roughly related to their use, and how the credit so extended
has put burdens on the seller for working capital which he solves' by
entering into some kind of a financing arrangement with a financing
* A.B. 1931, J.D. 1933, University of Michigan; Member of New York Bar.
I Gant, Illusion in Lease Financing, 37 Marv. Bus. Rev. 121 (March-April 1959) ;
Cohen, Long-Term Leases: Problems of Taxation, Finance, and Accounting (1954) ;
Kripke, New Developments Affecting InstallMent Financing Plans—Including Lease
Financing, in Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the Commercial Fi-
nance Industry (1956). For a less questioning view of leasing, see Steadman, Chattel
Leasing—A Vehicle for Capital Expansion, 14 Bus. Law. 523 (1959).
The writer once listed several questions as to the semantics of law and accounting,
and in reference to leasing asked: "Are the growing sale-and-lease-back of real estate,
and the less well-known chattel lease, useful economic devices with substantial differences
from mortgages, or are they just means of kidding the literal-minded accountants into
omitting the liabilities from the balance sheet?" Kripke, Book Review, 59 Yale L.J.
1551, 1555 (1950).
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agency? The terms of the negotiation between the retailer and the
financing agency relating to the transfer of the customer obligations
(which will be called "receivables" hereinafter) vary. There will be
"without recourse" forms of deals and there will be deals with various
types of limited recourse. Where the basic arrangement is "full re-
course", the question arises whether lawyers can shape the relation-
ship so that it becomes either a loan secured by the receivables and
creating a direct liability on the part of the retailer, or a sale-with-
recourse of the receivables, creating contingent liability in the nature
of a guarantee or endorsement on the part of the retailer.
Until these alternate possibilities sharply raised the question in
the field of receivables financing, lawyers and accountants had as-
sumed that they saw two clearly-marked forms of legal and business
relations. One type was a borrowing by a businessman from his financ-
ing agency, typically evidenced by his promissory note. The borrow-
ing might be unsecured; or it might be secured by a non-possessory
form of lien like a real estate or chattel mortgage; or it might be
secured by a possessory form of lien or pledge, as in a field warehouse
arrangement or a pledge to a bank of corporate stock or bonds or
other forms of evidences of indebtedness.
The other type was the sale of goods, with express or implied
warranties; of corporate stock; of negotiable promissory notes, bills,
or checks, either without recourse in specialized transactions or with
recourse when discounted with a bank. The sale of various kinds of
obligations to pay money, with recourse under an endorsement or
otherwise, leaves the seller of the obligation with a contingent obli-
gation in the nature of a guaranty.
The devices that have developed to keep pace with the require-
ments of retailers for financing of their instalment sales fall into two
broad categories related to the customary categories of loan or sale.
On the one hand, in the field of receivables resulting from instalment
sales of automobiles and other major units, the retailer typically
"sells" the "retail paper" to the financing agency, which notifies the
maker of the receivable that it has acquired his obligation and in-
structs him to pay the financing agency direct. Even when this trans-
action is with recourse on the dealer, it is held to be a sale.a On the
other hand, in the case of department store open-account receivables
or instalment receivables covering small appliances, furniture, jewelry,
soft goods, etc., the typical arrangement is that a portfolio of such
2 Kripke, Current Assets Financing As a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36 Minn.
L. Rev. 506 (1952); Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 III. Law Forum
580, reprinted in 74 Banking L.J. 1013 (1957); Kripke, Secured Transactions—Financing
the - Seller, 76 Banking L.J. 185 (1959).
a See cases infra, notes 10-14.
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receivables, constantly changing as to its individual components but
relatively stable in the aggregate, is pledged and the retailer executes
his promissory notes to evidence a direct borrowing from the financ-
ing agency. In many cases of the latter type, the collection by the
financing agency is "indirect", i.e., the retailer continues to collect
the receivables, and he accounts for his collections to the financing
agency. In such a case where the form frankly purports to be a loan,
it would unquestionably be considered a loan by the courts. There
are also instalment obligations resulting from the sale of refrigerators,
freezers, etc., where both financing patterns exist, and custom offers
no conclusive guide to classification.
Essentially, the two forms serve the same function. The retailer
is constantly selling goods which create receivables; he obtains an
advance of funds from the financing agency in exchange for the trans-
fer of an interest in the receivables; the financing agency is reim-
bursed as the receivables are paid; and it recreates its advance
against newly assigned receivables. The financing agency is paid a
"charge" for its services, whether expressed as "interest" under a
loan form or as "discount" under a purchase form. In both forms,
if the obligor under a receivable defaults, the retailer will ultimately
bear the loss if the obligor cannot be made to pay. The transactions
are nearly identical, to one who can view them freshly, without the
conditioning effect of professional training in Iaw or accounting,4
Yet, as applied to the transfer of "receivables", law and account-
ing have given two separate sets of consequences to the forms of
loan-with-pledge on the one hand, and sale-with-recourse on the
other.
Balance sheet treatment. A loan does not remove the receivable
from the retailer's balance sheet as an asset, but it creates a new
asset of cash, and a new liability representing the amount borrowed.
On the other hand, a sale-with-recourse removes the receivables from
the asset side of the balance sheet, replaces them with cash, does not
affect the liability side of the balance sheet, but merely creates a con-
tingent liability to be noted as a footnote to the balance sheet. These
differences in balance sheet treatment have important results in the
appearance of the balance sheet and in the computation of asset-
liability ratios, including particularly the current ratio.
Restrictive covenants. The handling of the transaction as loan-
4 	the Uniform Commercial Code, where sales of receivables and assign-
ments of receivables by way of pledge are subjected to certain identical legal rules,
with recognition of the fact that the parties may create contractual differences as to
disposition of surplus and liability for deficiencies. Uniform Commercial Code, Text
and Comments Edition 1957, 1-201(37) and Comment 37; I 9-102(1)(a) and (b)
and introductory Comment; I 9-502(2) and Comment 3; if 9-504(2) and Comment 3.
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with-pledge or sale-with-recourse also has important consequences
where the retailer is subject (under the terms of another agreement)
to various negative covenants forbidding borrowing, or forbidding
secured borrowing, or defining failure to maintain certain balance
sheet ratios as an event of default, or forbidding the incurring of
contingent liabilities, or forbidding the sale of assets otherwise than
in the ordinary course of business or- in bulk. Depending on which
covenants are in force, the differences in form may make the cove-
nants applicable or inapplicable. •
Instalment basis of taxation. If the seller of goods, on the in-
stalment plan sells the resulting receivables, he is not permitted to
use the instalment method of accounting for , taxable profits, because
he has received his cash immediately. If, on the other hand, he gets
the same or nearly the same. amount of dollars in a transaction cate-
gorized as a loan secured by the :receiv,ables, he is not deemed to
have received the money from the sale of the goods, and may continue
to use the instalment, basis. ,•
Usury. If the transaction is a loan, it ,is, of course, subject to
any local interest and usury rules. If it is a sale-with-recourse of
the receivable, the yield to the buyer on the purchase of the•receivable
at - a discount is not subject to ;usury limitations, because the. trans-
action is; deemed to be nothing but the sale of an article of, commerce
at a, negotiated prices -
The reader will by now have asked himself whether there is a
genuine difference between ,the, loan-with-pledge and the sale-with-
recourse to justify such extreme differences in consequences.. In both
cases the financing agency holding the receivable could look to the
retailer for payment, or the financing agency could itself enforce the
receivable and collect from the obligor thereof. Under . both forms
•
6 Elmer v. Com'r of Internal Revenue,' 65 'F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cit.: 11933); East
Coast Equipment Co. V. Com'r .of , Internal Revenue, 222 F.2d 6M . (3d Cir. 1953) ; see
also note 11. ,
Other tax points were formerly of importance: (1) A' loan-with-Pledge was given
recognition as , indebtedness 'in the excess •profits tax base, but the' contingent liability
resulting from the sale-with-recourse was not so recognized. See Brewster, Shirt Corp.
v. 1 Com'r of Internal Revenue, 159 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1947); Com'r of Internal Revenue
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., '204 F•2d 429 (9th Cir. 1953). ' In determining whether a cor-
poration met the definition of a personal holding company, a financing agency's charge
on a transaction deemed to be a loan was ."interest", • but its charge . on a sale-with-
recourse. was •not interest. Int. ,Rev. Code of 1954, 543 ; Southeastern Finance Co.,
4 T.C. 1069 (1945). The 'variations in results caused 'by this irrelevant conceptual
distinction necessitated an amendment creating a special exception in the definition of
• personal holding company. Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 542 (c) (9). • 	 , • • •
• a See bank and other cases cited in note 10. This is subject to, a • caveat in the
case of banks, 'which are subject •to statutory regulations as to the rate of "discounts"
as' well as loans. National Bank of Gloversville v. Johnson, , 104 U.S. 271 (188•) ; Nash
v. White's Bank of Buffalo, 68 N.Y. 396 (1876) ; Danforth' v. National State Bank of
Elizabeth,' 48 Fed. •271. (3d Cir. 1891) .-. •
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there is a situation with two parties liable. Attempts have been made
to define the distinction in terms of the question whether the financing
agency looks to the retailer or to the obligors of the receivables as
its primary source of repayment, but these attempts prove to involve
esoteric and insubstantial, distinctions. The fact is that in both forms
the financing agency looks to both possibilities of payment, with
varying degrees of emphasis, and there is no clear-cut line. An ar-
rangement which starts with the financing agency's reliance on the
apparently excellent credit of the retailer may change its complexion
entirely when that reliance proves to have been misplaced.
Bankruptcy. When that time comes—when the retailer is
bankrupt—we see .the most striking example of drastic consequences
flowing from the different legal classifications of two identical or
very similar transactions. Although in all cases the financing agency
is relying both on the credit of 'the retailer and on the credit of the
obligors on the receivables, 'supported by the title retention on tan-
gible goods, the rights of the financing agency in the bankruptcy of
the retailer may differ widely, depending , on how its relationship with
the retailer is defined. If the transfer was in loan-with-pledge form,
the rule of law is clear, namely, that the financing agency's claim will
be allowed only after deducting the value of his security, namely,
the receivables.' If, on the other hand, the transaction is deemed to
be a sale-with-recourse, then the bankrupt retailer was in the position
of a guarantor or secondary party. In that case, the rule is clear that
one ,
 can prove against a guarantor for the full amount of the debt,
and it is immaterial .that there is a primary obligor who may pay
and who has given security in the form of title retention on tangible
goods.'
The fascinating question arises whether, if a lawyer wants to
7 Bankruptcy Act, § 57(h), 11 U.S.C. § 93(h).
s Bankruptcy Act, 1(23), 11 U.S.C. § 1(23), defines "secured creditor" as one who
has security upon "the property of the bankrupt". See Hiscock v. Varick Bank, .206
U.S. 28 (1907) ; Ivanhoe Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark v. Orr, 295 'U.S. 243 (1935) ;
Prudence-Realization 'Corp. v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 189 F.2d 93.1 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. jolliffe, 74 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1934) ; In re United Cigar
Stores 'Co. of America, 73 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1934), .cert. den. 294 U.S. 708 (1935) ;
Gorman v. Wright, 136 Fed. 164 (4th Cir. 1905) ; In re Keenan, 15 F.2d '1006 (7th Cir.
1926) ; In re Adair Realty & Trust Co., 35 F.2d 531 (D. Ga. 1929).
There is a third form . in Which the recourse against the retailer might be expressed
•—namely, as an agreement to repurchase the retail paper on default. There is then a
possibility that the retailer's bankruptcy would be considered an anticipatory. breach of
contract, and that the 'remedy would be' the standard remedy for breach of contract
to purchase, namely, the difference between• the agreed-upon price for repurchase and
the valiie of the article 'to be sold; namely, the retail paper. This analysis would give
the ianie result as the loan-with-pledge analysis, namely, that the value of the paper
would be deducted in determining the provable amount of the obligation. See Bank-
ruptcy Act, § 63(d), 11 U.S.C. § 103(d) ; § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d); •
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invoke one or the other pattern of consequences, he can do so by
the form of his documents and by varying the elements of the pat-
terns, or whether there are some extrinsic tests so objective that legal
ingenuity cannot render them inapplicable. For instance, if a lawyer
wants to avoid the problem of usury, can he draft in the form of a
sale-with-recourse a transaction which usually takes the form of loan-
with-pledge? On the other hand, if he wants to permit the retailer
to use the instalment basis of accounting for tax purposes, can be cast
in the form of loan-with-pledge some financing involving types of
retail paper which are frequently financed by sale-with-recourse?
The answer to the second of these problems is certainly in the
affirmative, but the first must be considered not as clear cut.
A number of cases have struggled with the fringes of this prob-
lem, most commonly on the question of usury in cases of the financing
of open accounts receivable by the "indirect collection, non-notifica-
tion" method. By this method the financing agency typically advances
70% to 80% of the face amount of each 30-to-90-day item of trade
credit; the assignor collects the receivable and accounts to the
financing agency; the financing agency charges a stated percentage
per day or per month on the amount advanced or on the face of the
receivables; and the assignor is liable to "repurchase the accounts",
if the account debtor does not pay. For many years, this form of
legal arrangement was frequently drafted as a "sale" of the open
accounts receivable, but the courts steadily held that in applying the
Jaw of usury the financing of open-account receivables as described
is a Ioan and not a sale.9 In the leading case, Home Bond Co. v. Mc-
Chesney,'° the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized four
g Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916) ;, In re Gotham Can Co.,
48 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1931); In re Grand Union Co., 219 Fed. 353 (2d Cir. 1914), cert.
den. sub nom. Hamilton Investment Co. v. Ernst, 238 U.S. 626, app. dism. 238 U.S.
647 (1915) ; Briefly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. den.
282 U.S. 897 (1931); Commercial Security Co. v. Holcombe, 262 Fed. 657 (5th Cir.
1920); Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 285 Fed. 490 (6th Cir. 1922), cert.
den. 261 U.S. 621 (1923); Petition of National Discount Co., 272 Fed. 570 (6th Cir.
1921), cert. den. 257 U.S. 635 (1921) ; National Trust & Credit Co. v. F. H. Orcutt &
Son Co., 259 Fed. 830 (7th Cir. 1919); Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335,
163 P.2d 869 (1945); Barker Piano Co. v. Commercial Security Co., 93 Conn. 129, 105
Atl. 328 (1918); Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co., 278 III. 629, 116 N.E. 143
(1917); Mercantile Trust Co. of Illinois v. Kastor, 273 M. 332, 112 N.E. 988 (1916);
Wayne Pump Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 232 Ind. 147, 110 N.E.2d 284 (1953); Abeloff
v. Ohio Finance Co., 313 Mich. 568, 21 N.W.2d 856 (1946); Kelter v. American
Bankers' Finance Co., 306 Pa. 483, 160 AtI. 127 (1932).
Of these citations, the Grand Union, Commercial Security, Barker, Dorothy, and
Wayne Pump cases involved instalment paper.
Opposed to the foregoing weight of authority is In re Eby, 39 F.2d 76 (E,D.N.C.
1929). See also Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., 215 Fed. 633
(N.D., ID. 1914).
See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1197.
10 239 U.S. 568 (1916).
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factors: first, that the assignor collected the receivables, and at his
own expense; second, that the finance charge depended on the length
of time which elapsed before collection; third, that the withholding of
the "deferred payment" of the percentage not advanced was a treat-
ment like the collateral margin on a loan; and fourth, the recourse.
While the McChesney case has been followed in so many other
cases that the syndrome described can hardly fail to produce the same
result in the courts in an open-account receivables usury case, there
seems to have been no effort in the courts to apply the same consider-
ations in the classification of other financing transactions, and the Mc-
Chesney line of cases has not been cited. For instance, the existence
of recourse has been held not to make the transaction a loan as applied
to the transfer of automobile paper or of notes to banks for usury
purposes;" or in determining the applicability of the instalment basis
of tax accounting; 12
 or for other tax purposes." Indirect collection
and non-notification do not keep a transaction from being a sale rather
than a loan." It is believed that a percentage of advance below
100% is likewise not of decisive significance, because such advances
are characteristic in the financing instalment sales of certain kinds
of industrial goods, mobile homes, trailers, etc.' It is the writer's view
that none of these factors nor any combination of them is decisive
outside the types of financing in which the McChesney line of cases
arose.
This leaves for consideration the significance of the manner of
computation of the finance charge. Superficially, it would seem that
it Nichols v. Fearson, 7 Peters (U.S.) 103 (1833) ; G.M.A.C. v. Mid-West Chevro-
let Co., 66 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1933); 74 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1934); In re B & B Motor
Sales Corp., 277 Fed. 808 (D.N.J. 1922) ; Woodall & Son v. People's Bank, 153 Ala.
576, 45 So. 194 (1907) ; King v. People's Bank, 127 Ala. 266, 28 So. 658 (1900) ; Baer
v. G.M.A.C., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931) ; Lynn Morris Plan Co. v. Gordon, 251
Mass. 323, 146 N.E. 685 (1925) ; American Loan Plan v. Frazell, 135 Neb. 718, 283
N.W. 836 (1939) ; Coast Finance Corp. v. Powers Furniture Co., 105 Or. 339, 209 Pac.
614 (1922) ; Seltzer v. Sokoloff, 302 Pa. 449, 153 Atl. 724 (1931).
For the leading bank cases, see National Bank of Gloversville v. Johnson, 104 U.S.
271 (1881) ; Nash v. White's Bank of Buffalo, 68 N.Y. 396 (1876).
12 Elmer v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 65 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1933) ; East Coast
Equipment Co. v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 222 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Robinson
v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 73 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Alworth-Washburn Co. v.
Helvering, 67 F.2d 694 (C.A.D.C. 1933).
n In Com'r of Internal Revenue v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), decided June 22,
1959, the Supreme Court of the United States ended a long controversy, with sharp di-
vision among the circuits, as to the realization of profit following sales on the instal-
ment plan, where the retail paper is sold with recourse subject to a retained reserve by
the finance company. The court expressly rejected the argument that sale of automobile
paper with recourse, and with a retained reserve, was a loan.
See also the second paragraph of note 4.
14 Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945).
15 See note 12.
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the decisive characteristiC of the loan classification is that interest
runs while the debt is outstanding and is automatically adjusted if
the debt is paid late or paid early. On the other hand, superficially
the characteristic of a sale transaction is that the price is determined
once and for all. While no doubt the discount rate on the purchase
of a receivable takes into account the expected duration of the re-
ceivable, it is not expected normally that this purchase price will be
adjusted between the purchaser and seller of the receivable if the
obligor of the receivable pays late or pays early. But on further
consideration even this apparently definite basis for distinction be-
tween loan and sale shades off into indefiniteness. The note or con-
tract evidencing the receivable will normally require the obligor to
pay interest after maturity, or will impose delinquency penalties if
the obligor pays late, and the sale-with-recourse can make the retailer
liable for everything that the obligor of the receivable is liable for.
Thus, if the contingent liability becomes absolute, the retailer is liable
for an adjusted amount of finance charge or discount. Conversely,
if the retailer repurchases the receivable because of the obligor's
default early, in the life of the receivable, he receives a rebate of part
of the finance charge or discount, which is again adjusted in recog-
nition of the duration of the financing agency's investment as the
facts 'eventuated. Thus, the liability of the retailer , for accruing
charges in a transaction in sale form, where the actual duration of the
investment is greater or less than expected, is not very different from
his liability for interest on daily balances in a transaction in loan
form.
The writer reaches the conclusion, therefore, that so.long as law
and accounting give vastly different results to classifications resulting
from only minutely differentiated facts, there is a strong possibility
that the lawyer can select an important set of consequences by care-
ful draftsmanship.
Even where the McChesney line of cases seems to indicate that
for usury purposes the transaction may be held to be a loan, this
point may not be a problem in the particular transaction, and the
lawyer may still hope that his forth of drafting may affect balance
sheet consequences or the application of restrictive covenants.
Even more uncertain remains the question whether, in the ab-
sence of adjudication, accountants must give accounting effect to the
form put on the transaction by the lawyers' documents, or whether
the accountants may ever, in advance of litigation, undertake to reject
the contractual form of the transaction and classify it according to
their own conceptions of accounting or law.
Instalment selling presents constantly new challenges, and financ-
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ing arrangements between retailer and financing agency become
increasingly complex and varied. The questions discussed in this
paper will sometime have to be faced, and perhaps litigated. In the
meantime, they suggest that both for lawyers and accountants, there
is need for fundamental thinking as to the meaningfulness of our
present categories of loan and sale, and of direct and indirect liabilities.
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